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Abstract 
 
Due to the self-configuring nature of a Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET), each node must par-
ticipate in the routing process, in addition to its other activities. Therefore, routing in a MANET is 
especially vulnerable to malicious node activity leading to potentially severe disruption in network 
communications. The wormhole attack is a particularly severe MANET routing threat since it is 
easy to launch, can be launched in several modes, difficult to detect, and can cause significant 
communication disruption. In this paper we establish a practice for feature engineering of network 
data for wormhole attack prevention and detection with intrusion detection methods based on ma-
chine learning. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a self-configuring arrangement of mobile de-
vices interconnected by wireless links, with no fixed infrastructure like base stations and 
dedicated routers. MANETs can be used e.g. for establishing wireless sensor networks, 
vehicular networks, military communications, extreme rescue operations and providing 
Internet connectivity where some nodes are located out of radio range of an Internet 
connection point. 
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Due to the self-configuring nature, each MANET node participates in the routing pro-
cess, in addition to its other activities. Several routing protocols have been proposed for 
MANETs, such as Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) (Perkins & Royer 
1999) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) (Johnson & Maltz 1996), but security has 
typically not been a priority in routing protocol development (Taneja & Kush 2010).  
Consider for example a large scale MANET that is integrated in the future world of In-
ternet of Things (IoT), where devices both dynamically and autonomously enter and 
leave the network, and it is therefore difficult to establish trust relationships among the 
nodes. Consequently, routing in a MANET is especially vulnerable to malicious node 
activity leading to potentially severe disruption in network communications (Karlsson, 
Dooley & Pulkkis 2012, Agrawal, Jain & Sharma 2011). Such disruption can range 
from deliberately ignoring the routing protocol to tampering routing packets. For exam-
ple, to save energy a selfish node may simply not take part in the routing process lead-
ing to packet loss, while a malicious node can launch serious network attacks, such as 
rerouting packets from their original path to an erroneous destination node and even 
stealing the identity of a node.  
 
The wormhole attack (Hu, Perrig & Johnson 2003) is a particularly severe MANET 
routing threat since it is easy to launch, can be launched in several modes, difficult to 
detect and can cause significant communication disruption. Two collaborating malicious 
nodes create a fictive shortcut link in the network by forwarding routing packets to each 
other with the intention to attract more data packets to traverse the wormhole link. Once 
the wormhole has been successfully established, the malicious nodes can disrupt net-
work operation by either dropping packets or launching more serious attacks, such as 
eavesdropping and packet sniffing.  
 
A wormhole attack can be launched in either hidden mode (HM) or participation mode 
(PM) (Khabbazian, Mercier & Bhargava 2006). In a HM wormhole, malicious nodes 
capture and forward routing packets to each other without modifying the actual packets, 
so the wormhole nodes never appear in routing tables. A PM wormhole operates in the 
same way as a HM wormhole with the exception that the malicious nodes process rout-
ing packets as any pair of legitimate nodes and thus appear in a wormhole infected route 
as two contiguous nodes. The malicious nodes can forward routing packets to each other 
using either an in-band (I-B) or out-of-band (O-B) wormhole link. I-B tunnels packets 
between the malicious nodes via genuine network nodes. O-B wormhole links are more 
complex from the attacker’s point of view because they require an external communica-
tion channel, i.e., network cable or directional antenna, to establish a direct link between 
the wormhole nodes. 
 
Due to the open nature and lack of dedicated central nodes such as routers, routing secu-
rity in MANETs cannot rely on cryptography. Instead, security must be based on anom-
aly detection and trust in the network established based on node behavior. Several pro-
posals for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) for MANETs have been proposed in the 
literature but they typically do not take all types of attacks into account, especially not 
all wormhole attack types. Many research papers also propose mechanisms for detecting 
specific threats, but in a realistic MANET the most convenient solution would be a 
comprehensive IDS capable of identifying at least all severe routing attacks.  
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In feature engineering the most important factor has been considered to be the features 
used. For many independent features correlating well with a class, learning has been 
easy. However, if a class is a very complex function of the features, then it might be im-
possible to learn such a class. When the raw data is not in a form that is amenable to 
learning, features can still of be constructed features from it. It has been considered that 
most of the eơort in a machine learning project goes to feature engineering. (Domingos 
2012) 
 
In this paper we look at the feature engineering task of identifying wormhole attacks by 
pre-formatting MANET data for an IDS based on Machine Learning data. The contribu-
tion of this paper is to identify specific features of each wormhole attack type for distin-
guishing the difference between healthy and wormhole infected routes. These features 
can then be utilized for creating training data. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 an overview of previous fea-
ture engineering related research on IDS for MANETs is given. Chapter 3 provides a 
detailed overview of the different wormhole attack types and points out the specific fea-
tures differentiating wormhole infected routes from healthy routes. Finally, some con-
cluding comments and plans for future research on machine learning based IDSs for 
MANETs are presented in Chapter 4.  
2 RELATED RESEARCH  
The fundamental goal for machine learning based IDSs is to generalize beyond the ex-
amples in the training set. Hence, capturing the underlying complexity of the raw data 
set when performing feature engineering is of outmost importance. Simply reducing da-
ta dimensions or compressing data is often difficult, even for a well-known problem. 
Intrusion attack metrics are needed in feature engineering for machine learning based 
IDS implementations. Four wormhole attack metrics are defined in (Mahajan et al. 
2008): 
1. Strength: the number of end-to-end routing paths passing through a wormhole 
tunnel. 
2. Path Length: the length difference between an advertised routing and an actual 
routing path. 
3. Attraction: the decrease in routing path length offered by a wormhole. 
4. Robustness: the persistency of a wormhole without a significant strength de-
crease for minor network topology changes. 
Maulik & Chaki (2010) add a fifth wormhole attack metrics to this list: 
5. Packet Delivery Ratio: number of delivered packets divided by the total number 
of dispatched packets. 
 
Use of information entropy in feature engineering for selection of most relevant features 
in an IDS based on machine learning is shown in (Kayacik, Zincir-Heywood, & Hey-
would 2005, Tang, Jiang, and Zhao 2010). A methodology to calculate the Information 
Gain (IG) (Information 2014) for each feature and for each intrusion attack class in a 
training dataset for machine learning is presented and applied to the “10% of KDD CUP 
1999” dataset (KDD 1999). The most relevant feature in each class (22 intrusion attack 
classes and the normal class) is defined by the highest IG in comparison with other fea-
tures. Features in a subset of size 10 from a set of 41 features in the training dataset had 
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the highest IG in at least one of the 23 classes and these ten features were chosen for the 
testing phase. A SVM-based machine learning algorithm TASVM (Triangle Area Based 
SVM) was proposed and used in the testing phase in (Tang, Jiang, and Zhao 2010). In 
comparison with two other intrusion detection models, intrusion detection rate was 
higher in binary intrusion detection (99.88%) and in four of five attack classes (at least 
92,35 %) while false positive rate was about the same (2,99%). 
 
Mahajan et al. (2008) proposed an IDS for detecting I-B wormholes created by three 
malicious nodes, a pair of wormhole endpoint nodes and a node for forwarding worm-
hole traffic. The link between the wormhole endpoint nodes is called a self-contained I-
B wormhole, which can be extended to wormhole links between legitimate node pairs. 
The proposed IDS is based on anomaly detection in features representing measured de-
lays:  
x The difference between end-to-end delay and the sum of hop delays is anomalously 
large for wormhole infected routes. x Hop delays in uninfected routes are anomalously prolonged in nodes used by a 
wormhole tunnel because of the tunneled network packets. 
A hop delay is defined by the time spent in the sending node. Wormhole detection rate 
was in most cases 70 – 100 % in MANET simulation experiments with 4 randomly cho-
sen topologies for 15 nodes in an area size of 1500*1500 meter.  
 
In (Barani & Gerami 2013) machine learning based on One-class Support Vector Ma-
chine (OCSVM) (Schölkopf et al. 2001) is used for anomaly detection of flooding, 
blackhole, neighbour, rushing, and wormhole attacks in a dynamic MANET. Each net-
work node monitors own network traffic and measures own network state in a time slot 
as a p-dimensional feature vector. Each measured feature value is scaled to a [0,1] inter-
val value for input to the used machine learning algorithms. Machine learning consists 
of an initial training phase and an updating phase integrated in the detection phase. Each 
node updates in each time slot the OCSVM feature vector set with detected normal fea-
ture vector and removes feature vectors with weights less than a given threshold. The 
dynamic MANET characteristics are taken in consideration by weights decreasing over 
time for feature vectors in the OCSVM feature vector set. In simulation experiments 
with 30 mobile MANET nodes a feature vector with 22 values was measured by each 
node at each time slot. Three features were related to the used constant bit rate traffic, 
ten features were related to the route discovery process, five features were related to 
route disruption, and four features were related to the used modified AODV routing pro-
tocol. In the detection phase one node was selected to be a malicious node, which 
launched flooding, blackhole, neighbour, rushing, and wormhole attacks. Inclusion of 
the updating phase improved average detection rate from about 50% to about 95% and 
decreased the average false positive rate from about 10% to about 2%. 
 
In (Pastrana et al. 2012) the efficiency of intrusion detection in MANETs is evaluated 
for six classification algorithms i.e., Multilayer Perceptron, the Linear classifier, the 
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), the Naïve Bayes classifier, the Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM) model, and Genetic Programming (GP) algorithms. Detection out four dif-
ferent attack types i.e. Black Hole, Forging, Packet Dropping, and Flooding was studied 
in simulation experiments with 50 randomly placed MANET nodes. Eleven input data 
features were used for anomalous network activity detection i.e., number of Route Re-
quest packets sent/received, number of Route Reply packets sent/received, number of 
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route error packets sent/received, number of bytes sent/received, number of one-hop 
neighbours of each node, percentage of changed routed entries in the routing table of 
each node, and percentage of the changes in the sum of hops in all routing entries for 
each node. For simulation experiments with a multiclass dataset intrusion detection rate 
was about 75%, false positive rate between 5% and 25% and class error about 20% for 
all six classifiers. Excluding GP, classification results were best for the machine learn-
ing based SVM model. 
3 WORMHOLE ATTACK TYPES AND THEIR SPECIFIC FEA-
TURES 
In this chapter, different wormhole attack types are described in detail and their individ-
ual features are highlighted. The knowledge of these features can be utilized for generat-
ing training data for Extreme Learning Machine (ELM), SVM, and other machine learn-
ing based IDS algorithms.  
3.1 Hidden Mode Wormhole 
Consider the MANET scenario shown in Figure 1 where S is the source and D is the 
destination. The shortest path in terms of hops from S to D is in this case S - I1 - I2 - I3 - 
I4 - I5 - I6 - D. However, if malicious nodes M1 and M2 launch a HM wormhole, the 
shortest path is S - I1 - I6 – D as I1 and I6 falsely appear to each other as neighbors since 
M1 does not add its own IP address to the source field of the IP packet carrying the route 
request (RREQ) packet received from I1 to be forwarded to its neighbors. Instead M1 
encapsulates the original RREQ packet into a new IP packet that is tunneled to M2. 
When receiving the tunneled RREQ, M2 extracts the original RREQ packet and for-
wards it to its neighbors without modifying any of the routing packet parameters. 
Hence, to I6 it appears the RREQ was sent from I1 and as a result the IP address of I1 is 
added to the routing table as next hop on the route towards node S.   
 
A deviant feature of a route infected by a HM wormhole is that the distance between 
false neighbor nodes is significantly longer than between legitimate neighbor nodes. It 
is impractical to assume each node is able to get location information through a naviga-
tion system, such as GPS, but the distance can also be estimated for example by measur-
ing the packet traversal time (PTT) of a packet between two nodes, as proposed in 
(Khabbazian, Mercier & Bhargava, 2006). Each node can thus keep track of the PTT 
between itself and its neighbors. This track keeping can then be used for analyzing the 
validity of a neighbor.   
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Figure 1. A MANET example scenario.  
3.2 Participation Mode Wormhole 
If M1 and M2 (see Figure1) launch a PM wormhole, then the shortest path would be S – 
I1 – M1 – M2 – I6 – D. In this case, the PTT between M1 and M2 would be significantly 
higher than the PTT for any other pair of nodes. Since M1 can falsely confirm M2 as its 
neighbor and vice versa, neighbor validation is not reliable for identifying PM worm-
holes. However, PTT is still a reliable metric, if it is analyzed for a whole route, as is 
proposed in (Karlsson, Dooley & Pulkkis, 2011). So, a reliable and deviant feature of 
route infected by a PM wormhole is that PTT per hop count (HC) is significantly higher 
than for a legitimate route.  
 
Assuming that the malicious wormhole nodes always use the same identities (such as IP 
and/or MAC address) and that a network node is able to collect and track information 
about each intermediate node on every found route, as in the dynamic source routing 
(DSR) routing protocol, a deviant feature is that the malicious nodes appear as legiti-
mate neighbors on significantly more tracked routes than any other legitimate pair of 
nodes. The average HC of routes traversing the wormhole nodes may also be signifi-
cantly lower than the HC of other routes not traversing the wormhole link.  
3.3 In-band Wormhole Link 
An I-B tunnel is shown in Figure 2. In this case when M1 receives a RREQ packet from 
I1 it encapsulates it into a new packet that is sent to M2 through legitimate nodes (I3 – I4 
– I5). If a wormhole uses an In-band wormhole link it will produce a very high PTT 
since it includes packet processing delays at the nodes through which packets are tun-
neled. Thus PTT is a highly reliable metric for identifying such a wormhole.   
3.4 Out-of-band link 
An example of an O-B wormhole link is shown in Figure 3. On the other hand, an O-B 
link is much more effective than I-B as it has a significantly lower delay (meaning it 
will attract more traffic) and at the same time more difficult to detect based on PTT 
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analysis as it sets a high requirement upon the accuracy of the PTT measurement, espe-
cially if the wormhole is launched in PM.   
 
 
Figure 2. An example of an in-band wormhole link.  
 
 
Figure 3. An example of an out-of-band wormhole link. 
3.5 Summary of Features 
The features that can be utilized and analyzed for identifying the specific wormhole 
types are summarized in Table 1. The only feature that can identify all four types of 
wormholes is PTT/HC. However, if the wormhole link has a low delay, i.e. launched in 
PM O-B, there is a high requirement upon the PTT measurement accuracy, since the 
difference between a healthy and an infected route is typically less than a microsecond. 
Therefore the wormhole attack detection precision can be strengthened by analyzing 
multiple features. 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Machine learning based algorithms are effective for IDSs due to their generalizability. 
However, current algorithms proposed for MANETs are not capable of detecting all 
variants of the wormhole attack which is a severe threat on MANET routing. In this pa-
per, specific features for each wormhole attack type have been identified. In terms of 
future research, the aim is to create training data based on the identified features needed 
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for making machine learning based algorithms capable of detecting all types of worm-
hole attacks. A long-term goal is to develop for MANETs a single adaptive IDS, which 
is based on machine learning and capable of effectively detecting/preventing all severe 
routing attacks, in order to eliminate the need for using multiple standalone security 
mechanisms.    
 
Table 1. Features characterizing different types of wormholes and their estimated reliabilities:                  
1 = low reliability, 2 = medium reliability, 3 = high reliability. 
WORMHOLE TYPE O-B I-B 
PM - High PTT/HC (2) 
- Frequent appearance of 
specific node pair in 
routes (2)  
- Routes including specific 
route pair has lower av-
erage hop count (1) 
- High PTT/HC (3) 
- Frequent appearance of 
specific node pair in 
routes (2) 
- Routes including specific 
route pair has lower av-
erage hop count (1) 
HM - High one hop PTT (3)  
- High PTT/HC (3)  
- High one hop PTT (3) 
- High PTT/HC (3) 
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